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Abstract  
The importance of the front-end decision-making phase in securing projects long-term success 
is being increasingly recognized. This area is underrepresented in the literature, but there are 
several key themes that run throughout, identifying key issues or difficulties during this stage. 
Public investment projects do not always meet the expectations of different stakeholders. 
Many are delivered too late, at a higher cost, and do not meet the agreed quality standards. 
These are common problems that might have considerable adverse effect on operational costs 
and even the economic viability. In most cases, however, the long-term effects of such 
problems are minor. The more serious type of problems associated with projects is when they 
are not able to produce the anticipated effect. Clearly, a key to successful projects lies in the 
choice of concept.  
This paper presents some findings from the work of the Concept research programme, which 
was initiated in year 2002 to explore front-end management and governance of major public 
investment projects in Norway. It offers some findings from the research, framed as a number 
of paradoxes, and their implications for theory in project management today, 12 years after its 
inception. The point of departure is the contention that a project evolves during its conceptual 
phase as the result of two interacting processes of analysis and decision-making. The studies 
explore strengths and weaknesses in these processes in the early phase before the final choice 
of conceptual solution is made, and the extent to which projects under study are (or are likely 
to be)  relevant and effective in relation to needs and priorities in society. It concludes that 




A large and increasing share of the activities taking place in private as well as the public 
sector is organised as projects. In private sector projects, the ultimate goal is to improve the 
companys profitability, either directly or indirectly, through improvements in its 
competitiveness. In public projects, the commissioner is the government, representing the 
entire society and its taxpayers. In such cases, the benefits of the project must be considered 
in a broader societal perspective, to ensure that the project provides value for money and 
contributes to the desired development. 
There are many challenges facing public investment projects that must be overcome to 
achieve project success, such as lack of competence among planners, avoidance of hidden 
agendas during planning, underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits, unrealistic 
and inconsistent assumptions, and how to secure essential planning data and adequate contract 
regimes. Many of these problems can be interpreted in terms of deficiencies in the analytical 
or political processes preceding the final decision to go ahead. Hence, the importance of the 
front-end decision-making phase must be recognized to strengthen project governance.  
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The term governance is derived from the Latin word gubernare, meaning ‘to steer’. It refers 
to the administrative and process-oriented elements of governing, whether undertaken by a 
government, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal 
organization, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power, or language (Bevir, 2013). 
Governance is about processes of rule more than institutions of government. It relates to 
processes and decisions that seek to define actions, grant power, and verify performance. 
Different instruments are available to improve governance, ranging from legally binding 
regulations, to economic and other types of incentives, as well as information and skill 
development. The challenge in governance is to identify the optimal mix of different 
instruments. 
Project governance refers to the processes, systems, and regulations that the financing party 
must have in place to ensure that projects are successful. This would typically include a 
regulatory framework to ensure adequate quality at entry, compliance with agreed objectives, 
management and resolution of issues that may arise during the project, and standards for 
quality review of key appraisal documents (Samset and Volden, 2014). These processes and 
regulations can often be described in terms of stage-gate phase models.  
Project management refers to the processes established to organize and manage resources 
required to complete a project within defined scope, quality, time, and cost constraints. 
Whereas the literature on project management is substantial, project governance has only 
recently become an issue of importance in the project management community (e.g. Müller, 
2009). 
Peter Morris (1994) brought to our attention that in the early years, project management had 
an extremely narrow focus, reflected only in the project life cycle, and ignoring the critical 
front-end. He noted that as long as we only focus on the life cycle itself, we are missing the 
critical front-end and institutional elements (shown in his Management of Projects paradigm) 
that more accurately typify the responsibilities of the project owner and the project manager. 
The present study 
In the year 2000, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance introduced a governance regime for the 
country’s largest public investment projects, the so-called Quality Assurance (QA) regime, in 
terms of a mandatory quality-at-entry scheme to meet such challenges. It is a simple stage-
gate process with a top-down review of the quality of project proposals, which are typically 
the result of bottom-up processes of analysis and decision making in society. The Norwegian 
QA scheme includes two external reviews in the front-end: Quality assurance of the 
conceptual solution (QA1) before Cabinet decision whether to start a pre-project, and Quality 
assurance of the cost and steering frames (QA2) before the project is submitted to Parliament 
for approval and funding (see figure 1).  
In parallel to the QA regime, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in year 
2002 initiated the so-called Concept research programme, designed to focus on the front-end 
management of major public projects. The governance scheme clearly would be a unique 
laboratory for research on longitudinal data. It has allowed researchers to follow the largest 
public projects in Norway since 2002. The Concept programme works to develop the research 
frontier in the area of project governance. This is undoubtedly an interdisciplinary field, and 
the programme has conducted separate studies in areas such as public management, project 
management, portfolio management, economic analysis, planning, decision-making, risk 





 Figure 1 The Norwegian Quality Assurance regime, a stage-gate phase model with two external 
reviews in the front-end of major public projects. Source: Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
 
The idea was to broaden the perspective on projects. To quote Morris (2009:60), “effective 
management of projects is more than just execution-oriented project management. Projects 
are undertaken to create value and deliver benefits. Shaping the interaction between the 
sponsor’s goals and the way the project (or programme) is to be developed, in the best way 
possible, absolutely crucial – probably one of the most important aspects of managing a 
project”.  
This understanding is an underlying motivator of our research. However, the approach has 
been inductive rather than deductive. It has been more of a probe into new areas than a 
process guided by precisely formulated and theoretically founded problems. The perspective 
has been on projects as means to create value and deliver benefits. Some studies had a focus 
on decisions, others on analysis, but all of them were meant to provide insight into what is 
here termed project governance.  
Miller and Lessard (2000) contended that the front-end phase from inception and until the 
budget is approved by Parliament takes 6-7 years on average in major public investment 
projects. This is also the case in Norway. The subsequent implementation phase takes 
typically 3-5 years, and projects will have to be at least three years into their operational phase 
before an ex post evaluation can be undertaken. The Norwegian QA scheme has now been in 
operation for 14 years involving about 20 new projects each year. This means that there is a 
tremendous time lag as regards availability of empirical data. During the early years of the 
programme, researchers were first left with the option to do theoretical desk studies, and then 
gradually shifting into more hands-on studies of procedures and practices in planning, quality 
assurance and decision making during the front-end phase as more projects were added. Only 
recently, empirical data are becoming available. At present, the total number of projects is 
about 260, of which only 50 have been implemented so far. In addition, not more than 10 
projects have reached a degree of maturity that allow for ex post evaluations. 
Fourteen years after the quality assurance scheme was introduced it has proved to have a 
positive impact on cost control, since almost 80% of the first 40 projects were completed 
below budget, which is quite remarkable (Samset and Volden, 2013). Getting to grips with the 
choice of conceptional solution and securing the strategic performance of projects may prove 
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The present study draws on some research findings from the Concept programme, presented 
below in terms of ten paradoxes, all of which have implications for the theory of project 
management and project governance, as well as a concluding study that demonstrates some of 
their implications. The term “paradox” in this paper is used to describe situations with a 
counter-intuitive result, some of which are based on fallacious reasoning or incomplete or 
faulty analysis. These are the paradoxes of: 
1. how success is understood 
2. the significance of front end management  
3. early information overflow  
4. the opportunity space 
5. strategic alignment 
6. cost estimation 
7. disregarded analyses of costs and benefits  
8. “predict and provide”  
9. perverse incentives 
10. myopic decisions 
Their common denominator is that they all focus on the choice of conceptual solution. Each 
paradox is rooted in one or more studies in the program, but also inspired by research findings 
presented in the biannual international Concept symposia on project governance. According 
to Pinto (2004), these symposia “.. have provided much of recent theoretical and 
epistemological structure to the construct of project governance. Papers from these symposia 
have been on the leading edge of many of the insights we have on the current state of project 
governance”. 
The three first paradoxes are not rooted in empirical research, but in desk studies and 
literature reviews. The remaining seven (number 4–10) are based on cased studies involving 
5–40 cases, most of them are major public projects that have been subjected to external 
quality assurance under the Norwegian QA scheme. It should be noted that most of these 
studies are written in Norwegian only. The reports can be downloaded from the program’s 
website www.concept.ntnu.no, where also summary reports in English are available.  
Since this paper can only provide brief snapshots of the studies, most of the references will 
have to be found in the underlying reports, and are only to a limited degree included in this 
paper.  
 
1 The success paradox:  
Success is measured in terms of tactical performance rather than strategic 
performance 
 
The term “success”, used as an indicator, is a highly complex and aggregated measure. More 
than two decades ago Pinto and Slevin (1988), concluded that: “the concept of project success 
has remained ambiguously defined both in the project management literature and, indeed, 
often within the psyche of project managers…   Until project management can arrive at a 
generally agreed upon determinant of success, our attempts to accurately monitor and 
anticipate project outcomes will be severely restricted”. 
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“Success” may be interpreted differently by various individuals and institutions. It may be 
measured differently in different types of projects, and different individuals tend to assess the 
success of the same project differently depending on their preferences, values and to what 
degree they are affected by the project. In addition, the degree of success is time-dependent. 
For instance, Aaron J. Shenhar et.al (2001) offer a chronological sequence of events as a 
compound definition of project success: (1) Meeting time, budget, and other requirements, (2) 
impact on the customer, (3) benefit to the performing organization, and (4) preparing the 
future. The projects stakeholders do not necessarily share the same view of success. The 
project manager typically sees his job successfully accomplished when the project is done on 
time, within budget, and to specifications. The users will be concerned about the immediate 
effects of the project, and the investor or commissioner will typically be more concerned with 
the long-term economic viability.  
Success as a generic term means to gain advantage, superiority, accomplishment, achievement 
or added value. Measuring success will have to look beyond the immediate outputs of the 
project to assert the anticipated and wider impact in a longer-term perspective.  A hospital 
will ultimately have to be assessed in terms of its health benefits. An industrial project might 
be judged essentially in financial terms, and an infrastructure project in term of its utility.  
The assessment of success can be in absolute or in relative terms - that is in relation to what 
was agreed versus what was realistically achievable. Ambition is expressed in terms of the 
project’s stipulated objectives. Its effectiveness is a direct measure of what has been actually 
achieved. Clearly, success measured in absolute terms may give a misleading conclusion if 
objectives are unrealistically ambitious. By measuring in relative terms, that is in relation to 
what could reasonably be expected as compared with experiences in similar projects - the 
same project might possibly be considered a success.  
The media tend to give unsuccessful projects more publicity than successful ones. However, 
their perspective is highly restricted. The number one criterion of failure in the media is cost 
overrun; number two is delay in time. Truly, a much wider view needs to be taken on the 
success and failure of projects. The initial choice of project concept is of critical importance. 
This represents the one key decision of many made during the lifetime of a project, which is 
likely to have the largest impact on long-term success or failure, Williams (2008). Here, by 
“the project concept” we mean much more than just the technical solution – it includes the 
entire business case, all of the various organisations involved, and the various mechanisms 
and arrangements involved in the inter-organisational relationships, see Miller and Hobbs 
(2009). 
Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the projects’ tactical and strategic performance. 
Success in tactical terms typically means meeting short-term performance targets, such as 
producing agreed outputs within budget and on time. These are essentially project 
management issues. Strategic performance, however, includes the broader and longer-term 
considerations of whether the project would have a sustainable impact and remain relevant 
and effective in its operational phase, throughout its lifespan. This is essentially a question of 






Figure 2 Successful projects. Tactical performance is a question of delivering the project 
outputs as planned, while strategic performance is the worth or utility of the project as 




This is illustrated in Figure 2. Tactical performance is a question of how the project is 
implemented, i.e. how inputs are converted into outputs. These are measures of its efficiency, 
here measured in terms of the cost, timing and quality of deliverables. Strategic performance 
is a question of how the project performs after the outputs have been delivered. This will have 
to be monitored with the more compound measures mentioned above, which would cover the 
broader and longer-term perspectives and to a lesser degree involve focusing on technology 
and management issues, but more on societal and economic aspects.  
One example of tactically inefficient projects but viable in strategic terms could be the 
University Hospital in Oslo, Norway. Due to emerging new technologies and added 
responsibilities, captured during the engineering phase after the budget was decided, it was 
completed a year behind schedule and with considerable cost overrun, adverse newspaper 
reports and a public inquiry. No doubt that cost overrun was considerable in absolute terms, 
but in relative terms, it was equivalent to only a few months’ operational costs for the 
hospital, and therefore insignificant in a lifetime perspective. The overall conclusion after a 
few years of operation was that the University Hospital was a highly successful project; and it 
would perhaps be unfair to suggest that initial decisions should be able to capture problems at 
this level of precision. 
More serious by far is when a project fails in strategic terms, even if it successfully produces 
the intended outputs. It means that the choice of concept turns out to be the wrong one in 
relation to the problem at hand. In some cases, it may create more new problems than it 
solves, in others the initial problem no longer exists once the project is completed. One such 
example is an on-shore torpedo battery built inside the rocks on the northern coast of Norway 
in 2004, (Samset, 2008). The facility was huge and complex, designed to accommodate as 



















planned and without cost overrun. Already one week later it was closed down by 
Parliamentary decision, since it was obvious to all involved that a potential enemy would not 
expose its ships to such an obvious risk; the concept had long since been overtaken by 
political, technological and military development. What was quite remarkable was that this 
project, which can only be characterized as a strategic failure, got much less negative 
attention in the media than the University Hospital, possibly because it was a success in 
tactical terms. 
Clearly, a successful project is one that delivers its outputs and significantly contributes to the 
fulfillment of agreed objectives. Moreover, it should have only minor negative effects, its 
objectives should be consistent with needs and priorities in society, and it should be viable in 
the sense that the intended long-term benefits resulting from the project are produced.  These 
requirements were first formulated for US-funded international development projects by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the 1960s, and subsequently 
endorsed by the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the European Commission (EC). (USAID, 1980) They comprise 
five requirements or success factors that have to be fulfilled, i.e.: the project’s efficiency, 
effectiveness, relevance, impact and sustainability. These are tough requirements that go far 
beyond the issues that usually are covered by the media or indeed by many planners and 
decision-makers.  
Applied as standard requirements both up front and ex post when projects are evaluated 
would be likely to improve project governance considerably in the future. 
 
2. The paradox of the significance of front end management:  
Less resources are used up front to identify the best conceptual solution 
(project governance), than to improve tactical performance during 
implementation (project management)  
 
Projects are exposed to uncertainty in varying degrees and this is often used to explain their 
failures. Uncertainty characterises situations where the actual outcome of a particular event or 
activity is likely to deviate from the estimate or forecast value. Uncertainty may have many 
and various causes, related to the situation itself: the design of the project, the time 
perspective, available information, the implementation of the project, etc. (Ritchie and 
Marshall, 1993). Obviously, decision-making becomes difficult when uncertainty is high. 
Availability of relevant information reduces uncertainty from the decision-maker’s point of 
view. It is widely believed that uncertainty is highest at the initial stage, when the project 
concept is conceived, and that it tends to reduce rapidly as information accumulates over time.   
This line of thought is illustrated in Figure 3. It follows that the utility of adding information 
is at its highest in the earliest stage. It is also commonly believed that the decision-maker’s 
flexibility and the cost of making amendments are opposites. This is visualized with a similar 
graph. Decision-makers can juggle with different ideas and strategic solutions to a problem in 
the initial stages, but once decisions are being made, essential choices become locked, and it 
is more difficult and expensive to change the overall design. Therefore, major issues such as 
agreeing on the most effective solution to a problem and the choice of concept need to be 
dealt with as early as possible - later on is too late. Less essential issues such as avoiding 























Figure 3  People’s conception of how uncertainty is affected by information and how flexibility to 
make amendments is restricted by cost, as time passes in a project. Source: Authors 
 
In Figure 4, the distinction is made between the front-end and the implementation phase. The 
graph suggests that the potential to reduce uncertainty and risk is the largest up-front, and 
decreases substantially when the project is implemented. It is a paradox therefore that most of 
a project’s planning resources may be spent on detailed planning and engineering, while too 
little is usually spent on getting the idea right from the start where the potential to reduce 
uncertainty by means of adding information is the largest. The paradox is that most resources 
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Figure 4  The project life cycle. Uncertainty is greatest in the front-end phase and diminishes as 
more and better information is acquired for making decisions. Source: Samset (2010) 
 
 
Recent literature has highlighted the front-end phase including the project definition, as 
important for ensuring strategic project success (see for example Merrow, 2011 and Morris, 
2013). Where projects fail strategically, it is likely that the problem can be traced back to 
decisions in the earliest phases, when the initial idea was conceived and developed. What 
happens during the front-end phase is therefore essential for a project’s success. A study by 
the World Bank based on a review of some 1125 projects concluded that 80% of the projects 
with a satisfactory “quality-at-entry”1 were successful, while only 35% of those with an 
unsatisfactory quality-at-entry achieved success. (World Bank, 1996) Improved front-end 
management is therefore likely to pay off in a wider life cycle perspective, as evinced by the 
IMEC study (Miller and Lessard, 2000). One way of improving quality-at-entry is by 
challenging initial ideas and applying simple analyses, extracting and making use of previous 
experience from similar undertakings, and consulting with stakeholders. Jordan et al. (1988) 
argued that 15 % of the time and resources in projects should be spent on front-end work, 
whereas Miller and Lessard (2000) suggested up to 35 %. 
In most cases the key issue at the earliest stage is to shed sufficient light on the underlying 
problem that provides the justification for the project, and the needs that the project is meant 
to satisfy. Detailed information about possible alternative solutions is less relevant. This 
illustrates what seems to be a major dilemma, since most projects originate as one specific 
solution to a problem, while the problem itself may not be analysed sufficiently, and 
alternative solutions may not have been considered at all. Typically, the preferred concept 
originates in the mind of one individual, based on intuition and experience, rather than 
                                                 
1  Quality-at-entry was used as an indicator to characterize the identification, preparation and appraisal 






























systematic analysis of problems, needs, requirements, etc. Most of the information generated 
is associated only with the initially identified solution (Whist and Christensen, 2011) 
A second dilemma is that this information, which may be very detailed and specific, tends to 
lock decisions into the initially preferred concept – to the extent that this will inevitably be the 
one that is finally chosen. It is all too rare that alternative concepts are identified and analysed 
to the extent that they get a fair trial in the subsequent decision process.   
 
3. The paradox of early information overflow:  
Decisions are based on masses of detailed information up front rather than 
carefully selected facts and judgmental information relevant to highlight 
the essential issues 
 
It follows from the above that the front end phase is when fundamental choices are made, 
uncertainty is at its highest, freedom to choose is at its optimum, and available information is 
most restricted. Adding information, therefore, makes sense - but only to a certain degree. The 
crucial issue is not the volume but what type of information is needed.  
But contrary to the idea depicted in Figure 3 the sheer amount of available information 
upfront might not be the issue. In the initial phase of a project the priority is to establish an 
overall perspective, and to analyse the problem in its context, considering the needs and 
priorities of stakeholders, users and affected parties, in order to come up with a sensible 
strategy. Opportunities and risks should be considered. Experience suggests that creativity, 
imagination and intuition can be more valuable at this stage than large amounts of data.  
Decision making may be complex, unstructured, and affected by chance. Analysis may be 
biased or inadequate. Decisions may be affected more by political priorities than by rational 
analysis. Political priorities may change over time. Alliances and pressures from individuals 
or groups of stakeholders may change. The amount of information is large and may be 
interpreted and used differently by different parties. The possibility for disinformation is 
considerable. 
Another aspect is that the early selection of a concept tends to survive decision-making, 
regardless of process, expert-driven rationalistic or more open-ended and democratic. This 
makes a strong case for proper research to identify the most viable concept up front. However, 
time factor, complexity and lack of predictability also imply that the outcome of rationalistic 






Figure 5 Half-life of information. Validity tends to decrease over time during the front-end 
phase. More rapidly for accurate data than for less accurate estimates. Source: Samset 
(2010) 
 
Exact quantitative information tends to be more affected by time than the choice of concept. 
On the one hand it is obvious that the higher the precision, the more rapidly information is 
outdated.2 It is tempting to speak of the “half-life of information”, see Figure 5. For instance, 
exact information about the demand in a fast-developing market will have limited value after 
months, or even weeks. On the other hand, there are many examples to suggest that 
qualitative assessments tend to remain valid for much longer. Consider the assessment of 
users fundamental preferences within a market segment. While it might not be possible to 
make a valid prediction of the actual demand three years into the future, it may be judged that 
demand will continue for a long time and can therefore be relied upon in strategic planning up 
front. 
This suggests that restricted quality of information upfront may not be a major problem, since 
the need for precise information is low. It increases as the time for detailed planning 
approaches. In other words, the utility of exact information tends to reduce with the time-
span. The opposite seems to be more of a problem: when decision-makers are confronted with 
an abundance of detailed information at an early point in time it may result in what is referred 
to as “analysis paralysis”. This problem is discussed by Williams (2008). And besides, the 
cost of collecting information on a specific topic usually increases progressively with the 
amount of information collected.  This is because more information requires more in-depth 
studies or more wide-ranging information searches.  On the other hand, the gain in utility of 
additional information tends to decrease.  This is because there is usually a critical amount of 
information that is needed to get the necessary insight in a situation: Additional information 
                                                 
2  We need of course to make a distinction between lasting information, for example physical data on the 











will be of limited use. Maximizing the utility/cost-ratio will set a limit to the amount of 
information that is useful. (Jessen, 2012) 
This emphasizes the need to invest in relevant information at the earliest stage of a project, 
while at the same time limit the search to what is useful for decision-making at this stage. A 
targeted search for information regarding the main uncertainties likely to affect the project is 
more cost- effective than an unguided search, since it makes it possible to increase the share 
of relevant information and reduce the total amount. 
 
4. The paradox of the opportunity space:  
The choice of conceptual solution is made without systematically 
scrutinizing the opportunity space up front 
 
Every project is initiated to solve some problem or meet some needs. And every project faces 
a choice of concept in terms of how to solve this problem. Consequently, a key task in the 
early phase of a project is to identify possible ways to solve the problem it has been mandated 
to solve (setting up the opportunity space), furthermore to evaluate alternative concepts 
(limiting the opportunity space), and decide on the one best suited. There is much evidence to 
suggest that this is not always how things are done.  
One problem is that planners are discipline experts with an inherent tendency to emphasize 
some aspects of the matter and downplaying others. The same may apply to organization 
undertaking the planning; its rules, procedures, etc. This is the reason for path dependency 
(Margolis and Liebowitz, 2000; Dosi, G. 1997); systematically choosing some solutions while 
avoiding others, even if these conflict with rational choices.  
The situation become even more complex since these decisions are made at the intersection 
between the professional and political, in other words in-between what is rationally sound and 
politically possible. In the end, the complexity of the decision situation depends very much on 
whether there is agreement about what one wants to achieve and what are the best means to 
this end. (Christensen, 1985). 
A case study of 17 major public projects was carried out to explore the use of the opportunity 
space, i.e. how it was defined, the type of conceptual alternatives identified and the effect on 
decisions. (Andersen et al., 2013). It was found that in 11 cases the choice of concept had in 
reality already been made when the front-end process started, only in six cases, truly unique 
alternatives were identified. In most projects the analytic focus was narrowed to detailed 
project-specific issues at the expense of overall societal aspects. In half of the projects, the 
opportunity space was restricted to such a degree that real alternatives were excluded. There 
was a strong degree of path dependency where the alternatives represented a continuation of 
the current solution or variations over a theme.   
It was emphasized that these processes take place on the borderline between the professional 
and political spheres, especially since the political backdrop is what exerts the most restricting 





Figure 6 Categories of projects within the opportunity space. Source: Whist and Christensen 
(2011) 
 
While the analytical process is largely within the realm of the professional constituency where 
the intention is to expand the opportunity space to allow identifying the best alternatives, the 
decision still remains with the political level. And the processes and decisions at this level are 
not always rational, as illustrated in Figure 6. The two dimensions of rationally derived and 
politically feasible span four categories: 
 
• The win/win projects score well on both dimensions and “must be implemented” 
(Hydro power plant with no environmental downsides) 
• Rational projects, but which are not politically mature, where a quality-at-entry 
approach, such as the Norwegian Ministry of Finance QA regime can aid in the 
decision process to get these promoted (close down nuclear power plants) 
• Politically acceptable, even desired, but poorly conceived projects, these should be 
stopped, and the QA regime can help clarify the financial realities and thus kill such 
initiatives (Olympic games in a small country) 
• The lose/lose projects have no support in either direction and should never go further 
(private exploration of space) 
A separate case study of 23 major public investment projects, (Whist and Christensen, 2011) 
went deeply into how the analytical and political processes interacted during the front-end 
phase, in order to understand how this affected the outcome of the projects. It was found that  
the majority of projects started out with a predetermined solution. In about half the cases an 
unambiguous problem analysis was nevertheless carried out, and in one third of the cases new 
problems were introduced during the front end phase, Figure 7. The result was that two third 
of the projects were initiated with the same conceptual solution as the initial one, while in one 
third  of the cases the conceptual solution was a different or changed substantially. Ten of the 
projects were considered relevant in relation to needs in society. Nine of these had a 
comprehensive problems analysis up front, and the Government had been a central actor in 










These studies, and the examples mentioned, first and foremost illustrate the unpredictability 
of the political system in a mature democracy; a well developed, rational decision basis is no 
guarantee for a rational choice of concept. It was concluded that a scheme with external 
quality assurance of the decision basis provided to the political level had proved to have some 
positive effect in terms of helping make some choices more rational. 
While the analytical part of the decision-making processes overall was rather weak, the 
participation of and control with the participating actors was considerable in these projects. 
From experience we know that a bad starting point may be adjusted through a successful 
decision-making process, even when the original idea was quite wrong. We also know that in 
many cases this does not happen.  
This study demonstrated that there are many hurdles for any project. Democratic decision-
making processes, particularly those which take long time, are complex and difficult to 
predict, and many will claim that this is a necessary part of democracy. If this is taken as a 
premise, the study suggested that the biggest potential for improvement lies in strengthening 
the analytical process. What would seem to be a reasonable compromise in front end analysis 
and quality assurance of major projects would be that the first step should be to identify and 
eliminate the worst alternatives. These are low hanging fruits and proper action can give a 
high reward with little effort. The next step should be to seek for good alternative concepts, 
but within reasonable limits, and not necessarily crave for the best, since the case will 
nevertheless be handed over to decision makers to conclude.  
 
5. The paradox of strategic alignment:  
Strategy and alignment of objectives are highlighted as essential concerns, 
but in most cases the internal logic of causalities and the probabilities of 
realization are erroneous 
 
Alignment of objectives is the exercise to define the basic logical structure outlining the 
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goals to the delivery of project results (outputs), their outcome (effects) and long-term 
benefits after the project is terminated (purpose). This needs to be done before starting 
significant work on a project or programme. Unfortunately, this is not always done and can 
result in significant underperformance compared to expectations. (Cook-Davies, 2011).   
Any large projects, and particularly major public investment projects, are initiated in order to 
produce benefits for their owners (society). Many authors have studied success factors and 
predictors of failure, notably Morris and Hough (1987), Pinto and Slevin (1988), Miller and 
Lessard (2000); Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), and Hopkinson (2007). The available literature 
provides several different answers to why things go wrong and what could bring success in 
projects. Earlier literature tended to focus narrowly on the outputs in terms of cost, time and 
quality, whereas more recent literature may offer a wider perspective. For example, Morris 
and Jamieson (2005) study the processes, practices and people issues involved in moving 
from corporate strategy to projects. Their results are promising, though only based on four 
case studies. A common feature is that when projects’ strategic success is low, the problem 
possibly lies in the early phases of the project and at the governance level (the owner 
perspective).  
Some studies on international development projects have provided insight in this area. An 
analysis of a large sample of such projects concluded that most of the uncertainties affecting 
these projects were internal and not contextual, for a large part associated with aspects of 
management and the fundamental project design. (Samset and Haavaldsen, 1998) 
Consequently, the suggestion was that most of the problems ought to be met early, i.e. in the 
pre-study phase.  
Youker (1999) concluded that the lack of shared objectives and agreement on the objectives 
of a project was one of the biggest problems facing international development projects. A 
study of alignment of objectives in development projects based on a sample of 30 
international aid projects, concluded that most of the projects had design faults at all levels, 
and no projects were without faults. Typical problems identified were insufficient resources, 
and too many and unrealistically ambitious goals, (Samset, 2006).  
The same analysis was repeated on a sample of 17 large public investment projects in 
Norway, (Andersen et. al, 2013). A project strategy will always be a hierarchy of goals that 
are interlinked in cause-and-effect chains that illustrate the ambition levels for a project, as 
well as their realism. Objectives were analysed in terms of their internal causality, and 
ambition. Complex statements were broken down in several single objectives.    
The study found that in most of the Norwegian projects the goals are consistent with the 
needs, but there were shortcomings when it comes to achieving reasonable levels of clarity 
and ambition, as shown in Figure 8. For instance, when a project to acquire defence 
equipment presents “stability within the international legal system” as a societal goal and a 
limited road construction project expects to result in “increased settlement”, we intuitively 
understand that the distance between cause and effect is too large and that the goals are too 







Figure 8 Assessment of the goals in the sample of projects in terms of location in the goal 
hierarchy and their level of ambition. (Samset, Andersen, Austeng, 2014) 
 
Figure 8 compiles the findings from the study and breaks down the percentages of goals 
across the different goal levels. Of the total 152 goals presented by the 17 projects, by far 
most of these were defined as project outcomes with the majority of the remaining goals being 
societal goals. About a quarter of the project outcomes were in reality societal goals, while 
two thirds of the presented project outcomes actually were project outcomes. Also, a small 
portion of the social goals are completely unrealistic, while a small set of the project 
outcomes were in reality project outputs, i.e., specifying aspects of the project’s deliverables. 
In total, none of the projects avoided erroneous definitions of goals, but they performed better 
than the international development studies mentioned above. But clarity seemed to be the 
largest problem. Five of the projects had in reality no societal goals whatsoever, while others 
had too many. One project had as many as seven societal goals. In such a case, the strategy is 
of little help to focus the efforts and clarify the purpose of the project. Regarding project 
outcomes, the majority of projects had 3-9 project outcomes, two projects even more than 10.  
The purpose of formulating an objective is principally to clarify the direction for that which is 
sought. The scope also needs to be stated so one may know when an objective is attained. 
Multiple objectives may confuse if they all don’t point in the same direction. This is 
particularly evident if the objectives also conflict with each other. Objectives should give rise 
to common understanding among and motivation of all parties involved in or affected by a 
project.  On one hand, this means that objectives should be unambiguous and realistic. On the 
other hand, to motivate, they also have to be well founded, to the degree that they are 
accepted. Moreover, the objectives should limit the enterprise or the strategy. This means that 




















In looking at customary practice in planning projects, the threshold for improvement 
seemingly is very low and the possibilities of marked improvement accordingly are great.  
Regardless, practice indicates a need for more concise formulation of objectives in the front 
end phases of projects, at any rate to establish common understanding of where a project is 
going and how it will get there.   
 
6. The cost estimation paradox:  
The focus is on the final cost estimate (the budget), while early cost 
estimates are overlooked 
 
We have already discussed how planners devote less attention to identifying the best 
conceptual solution than to improving tactical project success. This is understandable to some 
extent because planners find it easier to relate to tangible and quantified success criteria such 
as cost and time, than to multidimensional and qualitative assessments of societal benefits. 
However, the investment cost is tangible and concrete, and crucial both to the choice of 
concept and to tactical success. Although cost uncertainty is higher in the early stages, it too is 
tangible and manageable (e.g. Austeng et al., 2005). Planners should therefore be strongly 
committed to establishing a rough but realistic cost estimate in the early phase, for 
comparison with project benefits.  
Under the auspices of the Concept research program a study of cost estimates in projects’ 
initial phase has been conducted (Welde et al., 2014). The study explored a sample of 12 
projects to determine the basis for and how the first cost estimates came about and developed 
during the whole period from the first initiative that was taken until the project was approved 
by Parliament. As shown in Figure 9 the first cost estimate in all 12 cases was far below of 
what was ultimately approved as the projects’ final budget. The increase in cost estimates 
during the front-end phase ranged from +70% to almost +1300%, with an average of +650%. 
By comparison, the cost increase during the implementation phase was much less, and some 






Figure 9 The earliest cost estimate as a percentage of the final cost, for 12 Norwegian projects. 
Source: Welde et al. (2014) 
 
 
The study is a first probe into the matter of early cost estimation. More research is needed to 
determine the extent of the problem and its implications. However, it indicates that initial 
underestimation may be significant and result in the approval of projects that otherwise should 
have been rejected in the early stages. The authors considered it likely that at least 5 of the 12 
projects would have been screened out at an early stage if the first estimate had been at a 
realistic level as compared with what was the final cost. The question is of course 
hypothetical, but there is no doubt that underestimation of costs at an early stage can have 
dramatic implications for project selection and is probably a far more severe problem than 
cost overruns in the implementation phase. Hence, it is clearly a paradox that so little attention 
is devoted to the initial estimate. 
The report discusses possible reasons for the substantial underestimation in early phases. An 
often used distinction is made between political, technical, and cognitive reasons (e.g. 
Flyvbjerg, 2005). It may be very difficult to prove that the cause is political, but in several of 
the projects there were clear indications that the first estimate was deliberately low in order to 
increase the chance of the project idea being considered. This corresponds well with other 
studies that have attempted to prove that costs are underestimated deliberately to make the 
projects appear more attractive (e.g. Wachs, 1987; Mackie and Preston, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 
2007; Welde et al., 2014). Wachs (1989) discusses how the most effective planner is 
sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientific or technical rationality. 
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approved separately in sequence. However, in the most of the projects there were also 
different cognitive reasons why costs had been underestimated up front. Over-optimism is a 
well-known phenomenon in cognitive research literature, see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). Further, the study discusses measures to reduce the problem of early underestimation, 
such as systematic recording of early cost estimates, the use of reference projects, of 
stochastic cost-estimation techniques, increased provisions for uncertainty to account for 
possible scope changes, and third party review at an early stage. 
 
7. The paradox of disregarded analyses of costs and benefits:  
Detailed estimation of cost and benefits is commonly done up front, but 
disregarded by decision-makers, who tend to emphasize other aspects  
 
A substantial amount of resources is devoted in major investment projects to establish a 
decision basis. Detailed Cost-Benefit Analyses are often performed, and complex models are 
developed to simulate traffic volumes and other inputs to these analyses. However, there are 
indications that decision-makers have little confidence in Cost Benefit Analysis in Norway.  
The transport sector is a special case. In this sector there is a long tradition of using Cost 
Benefit Analysis. A recent study conducted by the Concept research program, Welde et al. 
(2013) studied the significance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the final prioritization of road 
projects in Norway and Sweden, where the approaches to such analyses in the two countries 
are very similar and unit prices are of the same magnitudes. The study revealed that the Cost-
Benefit ratio had no significant impact on the selection of projects in Norway. On the 
contrary, many unprofitable projects were realized, such as spectacular tunnels and bridges in 
sparsely populated areas. By contrast, in Sweden, the results of the Cost-Benefit Analyses had 
somewhat more influence on the selection of road projects. Clearly, in the case of Norway 
there must have been other factors that were more important but that were not included in the 
analyses. 
One explanation for low confidence in the Cost-Benefit Analyses could be weaknesses and 
shortcomings in the methodology, see e.g. Næss (2006 and 2012). The trend is however that 
more and more effects are included in the analysis, and the empirical basis for estimating 
realistic values is improving. See for example Vickerman (2008) on the inclusion of so-called 
wider economic benefits from transport infrastructure projects. Another explanation for low 
confidence could be strategic use of analyses to promote a desired result. One study, by 
Kvalheim (2014), examined a special case where nine Cost-Benefit Analyses had been made 
of one project, a shipping tunnel on the west coast of Norway. This study found a remarkable 
lack of consistency between analyses. The analyses were performed between 1990 and 2012, 
and the Cost-Benefit ratio varied from 0.2 (highly unprofitable) to almost 1.0, and even 
exceeded 2.0 (highly profitable) in an ‘optimistic calculation’ provided in one of the reports. 
The analysis reporting the most positive number was funded by local stakeholders, with no 
financial obligations. An interesting finding was that the relative weight put on different 
benefit components varied noticeably, as shown in Figure 10. This underscores the credibility 







Figure 10 Percentage of the total monetized benefits in nine different cost-benefit analyses of the 
Stad shipping tunnel, showing how much weight was placed on the various 
components. Source: Kvalheim (2014) 
 
Not all effects of an investment project may be quantified and expressed in monetary terms. 
Nevertheless, if they are relevant to the decision they should be systematically reviewed as 
much as the net present value. Norway is often regarded to be at the forefront internationally 
when it comes to including non-monetized impacts in Cost-Benefit Analyses. However Bull-
Berg et al. (2014) reviewed a practice regarding non-monetized impacts in more than 100 
economic analyses in Norway. With a few important exceptions, their findings are rather 
discouraging. The section presenting non-monetized impacts in the economic analysis is 
characteristically short, and not based on transparent methodology and well-documented 
processes. The study concluded that there is substantial potential for improvement and a need 
for guidance.  
The paradox in this case is that so much effort is devoted to the calculation of a net present 
value that decision-makers may not find useful or credible. Clearly, planners should focus 
more on non-monetized impacts in economic analyses, as well as other complementary 
analyses such as cost-effectiveness analysis, impact evaluation, and multi-target criteria 
analysis. In addition, competence requirements are crucial to ensure high-quality analyses. 
The above situation is mirrored in the World Bank, which made wide use of Cost Benefit 
Analyses for decades to demonstrate its reputation as a knowledge bank and its commitment to 
measuring results and ensuring accountability to taxpayers. However, according to the World 
Bank (2010), the percentage of projects justified by a Cost Benefit Analyses has been declining, 
and the cost-benefit ratio is now rarely mentioned in policy documents. These results are 
explained by a decline in adherence to standards as well as increased difficulty in applying Cost 
Benefit Analyses in new sectors where traditionally it has not been applied and where benefits 
can hardly be quantified. The situation is that economic assessments are not performed at all. 
The World Bank concludes that there is a need to recognize the difficulties in quantifying 
benefits, but at the same time quality, rigour, and objectivity must be ensured because poor data 
and poor analyses are misinforming and do not lead to improved results. 
1990 1991 1993 1994 2001 2007 2010 2011 2012
Other benefits 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 55 23
Residual Value 0 0 0 0 0 16 51 11 0
Safety at sea 25 35 25 20 16 12 10 2 20
Coastal express line 25 20 43 65 37 11 30 19 40















8. The paradox of “predict and provide”:  
The tendency is to choose a “predict-and-provide” strategy rather than explore 
alternative solutions 
 
Different perspectives can be taken when evaluating the need for an investment project. As 
discussed by Næss (2005), public planners tend to use a predict-and-provide approach. When 
confronted with capacity problems, the planners, who are often engineers, almost always 
recommend increased capacity based on estimates of future demand. However, 
unsurprisingly, there is often excess demand for public services and infrastructure offered 
free-of-charge to citizens. The need should not be defined narrowly as a need to increase 
capacity but rather as a need to solve the congestion problem. The latter allows for a variety 
of measures, including demand regulation, congestion pricing, and legal and informative 
measures, most of which are far cheaper than a construction project to expand capacity.  
Our suggestion that needs should be considered in a broader perspective is supported by 
Odhage (2012), who studied early project planning in Swedish road projects. He found that 
the planners were never truly interested in finding and developing measures that would reduce 
the need for transport. This is obviously an example of path dependence, and Odhage asked 
the timely question ‘Can one expect anything different from a process that is run by the 
transport administration and concerns transport issues?’  
Further, in many cases there are political goals for a development that is quite the opposite of 
a predict-and-provide strategy. Næss (2005) distinguishes between (1) needs defined by 
national-level political objectives, (2) market-based needs as measured by demand or 
willingness-to-pay, and (3) the needs of different stakeholder groups. As noted, public 
planners tend to narrow down the identification of needs to the second demand, while 
ignoring the broader spectrum of needs, and even political goals to reverse the demand trend. 
A country with high ambitions to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases will view 
increased traffic (i.e. growing demands for roads) as a problem.3 Similarly, in the university 
system, a purely demand-based approach probably would not necessarily lead to a distribution 
of graduates in line with society’s need for expertise in different disciplines.  
The paradox in this case occurs when needs and benefits assessments in public infrastructure 
projects are decoupled from overriding political priorities and goals, possibly because such 
overriding societal goals are conflicting and multidimentional. The result of this is that issues 
such as scaling and capacity of infrastructure projects, highly political choices, are left to 
planners, who (i) have a tendency to define the problem narrowly as absence of capacity, and 
(ii) use readily available estimates of demand as a reference for adjusting capacity. There is 
obviously a need for project owners (the government) to clarify what needs should be taken as 
a starting point for planners, and to express them as clear objectives for the project. Only if 
the development given by trend extrapolation is a clearly desired one can the predict-and-
provide strategy be readily used in individual projects, as illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
                                                 





Figure 11 Traffic development in different scenarios, illustrating that the need for an 
infrastructure project follows from the assumption that capacity should adapt to 
demand. Source: Authors 
 
 
9. The paradox of perverse incentives:  
Public investments with no financial obligations for the target group may 
cause perverse incentives and result in counterproductive projects  
 
The state often appears as a generous donor on behalf of taxpayers when financing projects 
that benefit specific groups or geographical regions. Such projects may be initiated either by 
the beneficiaries themselves or by the state out of pure altruism. There are indications that 
such projects often prove unsuccessful in strategic terms, and we should not be surprised by 
this. When a project does not entail financial obligations for recipients, there is no incentive to 
opt for the most socially beneficial or cost-effective alternative. Different actors may have a 
vested interest in certain projects being chosen.  
The term perverse incentives refers to the situation where one or more actors are motivated to 
make choices resulting in a project that is a complete failure seen in retrospect. The 
theoretical basis is the principal-agent theory (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). There is a huge amount of literature on incentive problems in general, but 
less in relation to state-funded investment projects. A pivotal study in the field has been 
published by Ostrom et al. (2001), who demonstrate serious problems with perverse 
incentives in Swedish-funded aid projects that resulted in the waste of public funds and 
adverse side effects such as corruption.  
Norway is a special case because the local government is financially weak and dependent on 
the state to finance local infrastructure. The State is rich due to revenues from the exploitation 
of petroleum resources. Whist and Christensen (2011) demonstrate how the early phase of 
state-funded investment projects in Norway is often characterized by ‘local rationality’ and 
complex coalitions. Samset et al. (2014) explored the phenomenon of perverse incentives in 
nine Norwegian state-funded projects, to illustrate how perverse incentives might occur, what 
the causes and consequences might be, and what could be done to avoid them. One aid project 
served as a reference case to demonstrate how wrong things can go. The study revealed that 













(Figure 12). Some of these projects clearly would not have been prioritized had the recipient 
been required to contribute to the funding. Several projects were classed as supersized 
because they were ‘free-of-charge’. Moreover, Samset et al. (2014) found that costs were 




Figure 12 Selected findings from Samset et al. (2014), one aid project, and eight Norwegian 
state-funded investment projects without liabilities for the target group 
 
The problem of perverse incentives is twofold: (1) actors who act out of self-interest, and (2) a 
financing party that fails to reveal that. Measures to solve or mitigate the problem should 
therefore also be twofold: (1) aligning recipients’ objectives with national objectives, through 
requirements such as co-financing and local risk taking, and (2) reducing the information 
asymmetry by introducing, for example, by information control, external review, and public 
hearings. The Norwegian quality assurance regime is thus a measure that is expected to 
reduce the problem of perverse incentives. 
 
10. The paradox of myoptic decisions:  
Long-term viability is the intention but the planning horizon is too short, 
resulting in sub-optimal choices that one will regret later 
 
Probably the most crucial strategic success criterion for an investment project is that it is 
viable and sustainable, i.e. that project net benefits are likely to continue in the long run 
(OECD, 2002). 
Viability can only be determined in the very long run. Samset (2012) studied 10 projects from 
history, and found that only a few were still considered highly successful and thus viable 
more than 100 years after completion, whereas others had been closed down after a short 
time. Needs and priorities in society may change over the years, and therefore a project’s 
viability is contingent upon its ability to adapt to changing needs. Ironically, one of the most 
viable projects in the study was the Eiffel Tower, which was built for no other purpose than to 
be an exhibition object to showcase France as a leader in science and technology, but which 
later became one of the greatest tourist attractions in the world. 













Hvaler-tunnelen Subsea road tunnel 1989 200 No Yes Limited Limited
Linesøya  Bridge 2011 250 Minimal No No No
St. Olavs Hospital Hospital 2014 13 000 Minimal No Limited Limited
Turkana Fisheries (Kenya) Development aid 1990 1 500 Yes No No No
OL Lillehammer Sports event 1994 7 500 Yes Limited Yes No
E16 Lærdalstunnelen Road tunnel 2000 1 050 Yes Yes Limited No
Lofast Subsea road tunnel 2007 1 367 Yes Yes Limited No
Rock city Cultural building 2013 50 Yes Limited No No




Since viability can only be determined in the long run, an assessment of viability ex ante must 
have a long-term perspective and the planner must be able to think creatively about possible 
future scenarios. It is not sufficient that the project is feasible and relevant on the opening day; 
planners must consider whether it will continue to be so throughout its lifetime. Lædre et al. 
(2012) studied 24 appraisal reports of major public projects from the period 2005-2011 with 
respect to their assessments of viability. The results were rather disappointing: needs and 
benefits were most often assessed in a short-sighted and static perspective; trends were 
extrapolated without discussing alternative scenarios; most attention was devoted to tangible 
effects, ignoring non-monetized impacts; and significant risk factors, such as political risk, 
were not identified and discussed. Such practice may lead to myopic decisions, which we are 
likely to regret in the future, as illustrated in figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Illustration of myopic decisions. Two projects with identical investment cost have 
different net benefit flows throughout their life-time. In a long-term perspective it is 
clear that project 2 is more viable, but a myopic planner would emphasize short-term 
effects and choose project 1. For example, investments in preparedness and prevention 
capacities are often very low, something that one regrets later when a disaster strikes. 
Source: Authors 
 
However, Lædre et al. (2012) also noted that no single analytical tool is able to comprehend 
all aspects of a projects viability ex ante. In particular, a Cost-Benefit Analysis, although 
intending to capture all economic impacts of a project, cannot provide sufficient analysis of 
viability, one important reason being the use of a discount rate. Therefore, in order to assess 
viability properly, several complementary tools combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are necessary. A separate study by Hagen (2011) goes further into the question of 
how the Cost-Benefit Analysis, through the use of a discount rate, leads to short-termism and 
neglect of future generations. However, Hagen also shows that it may be appropriate to use a 
decreasing discount rate over time. This would in fact increase the planning horizon and thus 












Benefits - costs 
Net benefits =
Benefits - costs 
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The paradox in this case is that the emphasis on viability as a success criterion is far from 
reflected in project appraisals. Projects that are meant to last for decades and sometimes 
centuries may have significant impact on economic, environmental, and social development, 
yet they are still assessed in a short-term and static perspective. Lædre et al. (2012) offer some 
recommendations for how to obtain a broader and more long-term perspective in project 
appraisals. They involve shifting the analysts attention away from detailed estimations of 
investment cost to estimating future benefit flows and corresponding risk. Undoubtedly, 
evaluating a project’s viability ex ante can be challenging, but the alternative of finding out 
about its unviability too late is worse. 
Discussion 
Governance regimes for major investment projects comprise the processes and systems that 
need to be in place on behalf of the financing party to ensure successful investments. What 
happens during the front end phase is essential. Peter Morris (2011:7) writes that “It is evident 
from an extensive amount of research that management of the front-end definitional stages of 
projects is of overwhelming importance to their ultimate outcome yet we have little empirical 
data to suggest how best management competencies here should be improved.” 
Project governance has only recently become an issue in the project management community. 
In order to move forward in this field we have to find answers to what would be the optimal 
mix of regulations, economic means and information in improved governance regimes. What 
seems to be an issue for the project management community is to lift their perspective beyond 
the delivery of the project itself and onto the broader issues of the projects utility and effects. 
It is obviously not only about the quality of analyses up front but also about decision 
processes. To arrive at the optimal conceptual solution based on rational analysis is of little 




Figure 14   There is a consistent tendency that projects that are considered relevant have less flaws 
in the analysis and decision making processes up front. (Samset, 2008) 
 
The Concept program did a pilot project on a sample of cases to illustrate this (Samset, 2008), 
which was followed up with a more in depth study to explore the quality and interaction 
between analysis and decisions during the front end phase (Whist and Christensen, 2011) and 
Sum
Analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Alternative concepts have not been scrutinized X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15
Strategic underestimation of expected costs X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Inadequate/limited analysis of problems and needs X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Lack of realistic objectives and justification X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Tactical splitting up and sequencisng of project X X X X X X X X X X 10
Predictable surprises not taken into account X X X X X X 6
Decisions
Disagreement regarding objectives and justification X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Expert advice overruled by political preferences X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13
Long lasting front end phase with shifting priorities X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Repeated playoff in political decision process X X X X X X 6
Perverse incentives - benefits without liability X X X X X 5
Political horse-trading between competing parties X X X X 4
Sum 10 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1




a broader follow-up of the pilot, (Samset and Volden, 2013). The result is displayed in Figure 
14, where the flaws for the individual projects are plotted with “X”. The summary row at the 
bottom are marked to signify whether they are considered relevant as seen in relation to needs 
and priorities in society (white colour) or not (black). Each project is represented with one 
column. The columns are sorted from left to right according to the observed number of flaws. 
The resulting pattern suggests that the least relevant projects have a lot of flaws in their 
analytic and decision making processes (between five and ten). The ones that are regarded 
relevant on the other hand have much less flaws (between one and four).  
The studies concluded that there is a strong tendency to choose the initial concept and stick to 
it, almost regardless of how bad it is. Also, there is an overwhelming inertia. Once the train 
has been set in motion – it is always impossible to stop. This goes a long way to explain the 
red projects on the left hand side. Further there is a third common tendency, that incremental 
improvements of an inferior solution are preferred rather than fundamental change.  
On the other hand experience also suggests that the opportunity space is usually larger than 
envisioned – and it is often largely unexplored. What was evident, however, was that the 
green projects seemed to have been exposed to more vigorous analyses and decision processes 
that were less affected by disagreements, political preferences, lengthy processes and repeated 
playoffs in the political decision processes.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper reports from several in-depth case studies of major public projects, and identifies a 
number of paradoxes that could guide further research. In various ways the paradoxes point to 
two types of problems, i) problems of efficiency in terms of delays and cost overrun, and ii) 
more fundamental problems that have to do with the projects strategic success (choosing the 
wrong concept). Project management as a discipline should be concerned with both problems. 
To quote Peter Morris: “The discipline needs to be less inward looking: more relevant, not 
just to the sponsors needs but to societys challenges in general. We can foresee several 
changes in the years ahead in the ways projects and programs will be managed, but the 
obvious immediate needs are to focus more on improving sponsor value and on shaping the 
context in which projects and programs are formed and implemented” (Morris, 2013:23). 
Many of the problems facing major public investment projects can be interpreted in terms of 
deficiencies in the analytic or the political processes preceding the final decision to go ahead, 
and the complexity and uncertainties affecting these processes. In particular, the fundamental 
problems with strategic success could typically be traced back to deficiencies in the earliest 
preparatory phases of the project. The role of the front-end phase in ensuring project success 
is therefore crucial, as highlighted in the literature (Merrow, 2011, Morris, 2013). 
Project governance is the processes, systems, and regulations that the financing party must 
have in place to ensure that projects are successful, strategically as well as tactically. Many 
organisations have introduced stage-gate phase models, also the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, who introduced a QA scheme to ensure the best choice of concept (QA1) and 
efficient project implementation (QA2) in year 2000. Our research indicates that QA2 has 
already led to improved cost control. It is still too early to conclude that QA1 has improved 
the choice of conceptual solutions and projects strategic success, but there is evidence to 
suggest that an independent review of the project appraisal documents at a very early stage 
has a positive effect.  There are many fundamental challenges that will have to be dealt with, 
such as tactical budgeting in local communities and responsible agencies at various levels, 
which is done in order to increase the chance to obtain government funding for a project. 
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Another challenge is to ensure a transparent and democratic process and avoid adverse effects 
of stakeholders involvement and political bargaining. But also to make the process predictable 
is a major challenge. The QA regime attempts to remedy these problems. 
One salient conclusion from the research is that ex post evaluation should be an essential 
element in any project governance scheme. When a project succeeds at all levels, it should be 
imperative to ask what was done right. Correspondingly, one should learn from mistakes. 
However, experience shows that the use of evaluations for learning purposes is limited, and 
this is particularly true in the public sector (Samset and Christensen, 2012). The tendency is to 
look ahead with the concern of how to spend next years budget, rather that look in the rear 
mirror to learn from experience. 
As a lead part of the current trailing research on Norwegian public projects, the Concept 
research program has since its inception been concerned with project evaluation and 
evaluation methodology as evidenced in several studies, including those by Olsson (2005), 
Andersen et al. (2007), and Volden and Samset (2013). The latter is a summing up of four 
pilot evaluations of so called QA projects. It recommends that systematic ex post evaluations 
of public investment projects should be carried out to learn from experience, not least how 
they perform in a strategic perspective, with the aim to improve public investment projects in 
the future. Under the auspices of the program therefore, a number of the major investment 
projects are now being evaluated, and this will continue in the years to come. Figure 15 shows 
some main results for the first nine projects. 
 
 
Figure 15 Main results from ex post evaluations of nine Norwegian investment projects (three 
stars = high success, two=medium success, one= unsuccessful). For more detailed results, see the 
evaluation reports, available on www.ntnu.no/concept  
 
Clearly, projects may fail even when formal rules for planning and decision making have been 
adhered to. Democratic decision-making processes, particularly the long lasting ones, are 
complex and the outcome difficult to predict. Many will claim that this is a necessary part of 
democracy. If this is taken as a premise, one could conclude that the biggest potential for 
improvement lies in strengthening the analytical process, as well as making decision 






Svinesund national border control facility
Sandvika-Asker inter-city rail line
Momarken-Sekkelsten, section of a highway
Skjold class missile torpedo vessels
Eiksund road system
Lofast road system
E6 Riksgrensen-Sv.skogen, section of a highway






Andersen B., Bråthen, S., Fagerhaug T., Nafstad O., Næss P. and Olsson N. (2007), 
Effektvurdering av store statlige investeringsprosjekter (Impact Assessment of Major Public 
Investment Projects). Concept report no. 19 
Andersen B., Samset K., Austeng K. (2014), To Which Extent Do Projects Explore the 
Opportunity Space? A study of conceptual appraisals and the choice of conceptual solutions. 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business/Emerald 2014 Volume 7.(3) s. 473-
492 
Austeng K., Torp O., Midtbø J.T., Helland V. and Jordanger I. (2005), Usikkerhetsanalyse – 
Metoder (Uncertianty analysis – methodology), Concept report no. 12 
Bevir M. (2013), Governance: A very short introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bull-Berg H., Volden G.H. and Grindvoll I.L.T. (2014), Ikke-prissatte virkninger i 
samfunnsøkonomisk analyse. Praksis og erfaringer i statlige investeringsprosjekter (Non-
Monetized Impacts in Economic Analysis. Practice and Lessons from Public Investment 
Projects), Concept report no. 38  
Christensen K. (1985), “Coping with Uncertainty in Planning“ Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 51:1, 63-73 
Cook-Davies T., (2009), “Front-end Alignment of Projects – Doing the Right Project”, in 
Williams T. et. al. (eds.) Making Essential Choices with Scant Information, Palgrave 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, UK 2009 
Dosi G. (1997), “Opportunities, Incentives and the Collective Patterns of Technological 
Change” The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, Issue 444, 1530-1547 
Flyvbjerg B., Bruzelius N. and Rothengatter W. (2003), Megaprojects and Risk; An Anatomy 
of Ambition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Flyvbjerg B. (2005), Policy and Planning for Large Infrastructure Projects: Problems, 
Causes, Cures. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3781, December 2005. 
Flyvbjerg B. (2007), “Cost Overrun and Demand Shortfalls in Urban Rail and Other 
Infrastructure”. Transport Planning and Technology, 30 (1), pp. 9-30. 
Hagen K.P. (2010), Markedsorienterte styringsmetoder i miljøpolitikken (Market oriented 
approaches to environmental policy). Concept report no 24 
Hagen K.P. (2011), Verdsetting av fremtiden. Tidshorisont og diskonteringsrenter (Valuing 
the future. Time horizon and discount rates). Concept report no. 27 
Hopkinson M. (2007), Ten Causes of Megaproject Failure. APM Conference; The Business 
of Projects, London, 30–31 October 2007.  
Jensen M. and Meckling W. (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), 305-360 
Jordan G., Lee, I. and Cawsey G. (eds) (1988), Learning From Experience. A Report on the 
Arrangements for Managing Major Projects in the Procurement Executive, Ministry of 
Defence; London, HMSO, 1988. 
29 
 
Kvalheim E.V. (2014), Nyttekostnadsanalyse av Stad skipstunnel. En gjennomgang og 
reanalyse av tidligere analyser, (Cost-Benefit Analysis of Stad shipping tunnel. A review and 
reanalysis of previous analyzes), Master thesis, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, 2014 
Laffont J.-J. and Martimort D. (2002), The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model, 
Princeton University Press, 440 pp., USA 
Lædre O., Volden, G.H. and Haavaldsen T. (2012), Levedyktighet og investeringstiltak. 
Erfaringer fra kvalitetssikring av statlige investeringsprosjekter (Sustainability and public 
Investments. Lessons from major public investment projects). Concept report no. 29 
Mackie P. and Preston J. (1998), “Twenty-one sources of error and bias in transport project 
appraisal”. Transport Policy, 5 (1), pp. 1-7. 
Margolis S. E. and Liebowitz S. J. (2000), “Path Dependence, Lock-in and History”, 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 11:1, 205-226 
Marshall D. and Ritchie B. (1993), Business Risk Management, Chapman & Hall: London. 
ISBN 0-412-43100-9  
Merrow E.W. (2011), Industrial megaprojects: Concepts, strategies and practices for success, 
Wiley, 384 p. 
Miller R. and Hobbs B. (2009), “The Complexity of Decision-making in Large Projects with 
Multiple Partners: Be Prepared to Change”, in Williams T. et. al. (eds.) Making Essential 
Choices with Scant Information, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, UK 2009 
Miller R. and Lessard D., (2000), The strategic Management of Large Engineering Projects: 
Shaping institutions, Risk and Governance. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press 
Morris P.W.G. and Hough G.H. (1987), The Anatomy of Major Projects. A Study of the 
Reality of Project Management. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.  
Morris P.W.G. (1994), The Management of Projects, London, UK: Thomas Telford  
Morris P.W.G., (2009), “Implementing Strategy Through Project Management: The 
Importance of Managing the Project Front-end”. In  Williams, T.W, Samset, K., Sunnevaag. 
K.J,  Making Essential Choices with Scant Information Front-End Decision Making in Major 
Projects, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pages 39-67  
Morris P.W.G, (2011), “Managing the Front-End: Back to the beginning”, in Project 
Perspectives, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 4 – 9, International Project Management Association  
Morris P.W.G. (2013), “Reconstructing Project Management Reprised: A Knowledge 
Perspective”, Project Management journal, Volume 44, Issue 5, October 2013 Pages 6-23 
Morris P.W.G. and Jamieson, A. (2005), “Moving from Corporate Strategy to Project 
Strategy”. Project Management Journal. 36: 4, 5-18. 
Müller R., (2009), Project Governance. Gower Publishing Limited 
Næss P. (2005), Bedre behovsanalyser. Erfaringer og anbefalinger om behovsanalyser i store 
offentlige investeringsprosjekt (Needs Analysis in Major Public Investment Projects. Lessons 
and Recommendations), Concept report no. 5 
Næss P. (2006), “Cost-benefit Analysis of Transport Investments: Neither Critical nor 
Realistic”, Journal of Critical Realism. 5: 32-60. 
30 
 
Næss P. (2012), Critical view of cost–benefit analyses, Presentation at: Concept Symposium 
2012: Valuing the Future - Public Investments and Social Return (2012), Norway 
Odhage J. (2012), Åtgärdsvalsstudie - en ny planeringsaktivitet för bättre lösningar på 
transportrelaterade problem. Erfarenheter från de första testfallen, KTH Architecture and the 
Built Environment, Stockholm 
OECD (2002), Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 2000 
Olsson N.O.E (2005), Hvordan trur vi at det blir? Effektvurderinger av store offentlige 
prosjekt (Up-front conjecture of anticipated effects of major public investment projects), 
Concept report no. 7 
Ostrom E., Gibson C. Shivakumar S. and Andersson K. (2001), Aid, Insentives, and 
Sustainability. An institutional analysis of development cooperation, SIDA studies and 
evaluation 02/01, Swedish International Cooperation Agency, Stockholm 
Pinto J.K., Slevin D.P., (1988), “Project Success: Definition and Measurement Techniques”, 
Project Management Journal, Vol. XIX No. 1, February 1988  
Pinto J., (2014), Project Management, Governance, and the Normalization of Deviance, 
International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 2014 pages 376-387 
Samset K. (2006), Design of High-uncertainty Projects in International Aid. PROMAC 2006, 
Sydney, September 2006. Australian Institute of Project Management  
Samset K. (2008), Concepts and Decision – Rationality and Chance. Some paradoxes and 
reflections, Presentation to the 3rd International Symposium on Project Governance, The 
Norwegian University of Science and technology/Concept, September 2008, Trondheim, 
Norway  
Samset K. (2008), “How to overcome major weaknesses in mega-projects: the Norwegian 
approach”, in Priemus, H. et al (eds.), “Decision-Making on Mega-Projects Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Planning and Innovation”,  Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK, 2008  
Samset K., (2009), “Projects, Their Quality at Entry and Challenges in the Front-end Phase”, 
in Williams, T. et al. (eds), Making Essential Choices with Scant Information Front-End 
Decision Making in Major Projects, Palgrave Macmillan, UK   
Samset K., (2010), “Early Project Appraisal. Making the Initial Choices”, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK   
Samset K. (2012), Beforehand and long thereafter. A look-back on the concepts of some 
historical projects. Ex Ante Academic Publisher 
Samset K. and Christensen T. (2012), «Evaluering av prosjekter ex ante og ex post – og 
beslutningsprosessenes kompleksitet og betydning», chapter in Evaluering. Tradisjoner, 
praksis, mangfold, Fagbokforlaget, Oslo, 2013 
Samset K. and Volden G.H. (2013), Investing for impact. Lessons with the Norwegian State 
Project Model and the first investment projects that have been subjected to external quality 
assurance, Concept report no. 36 
Samset K. and Volden G.H. (2013), Major Projects up Front: Analysis and Decision – 
Rationality and Chance, Paper presented at the IRNOP conference , Oslo 2013 
31 
 
Samset K., (2014), “Strategic and tactical performance of mega-projects – between successful 
failures and inefficient successes”, in H. Priemus and Bert van Wee (eds.), International 
Handbook on Mega-Projects, Chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 
Samset K. and Volden G.H. (2014), “Front end Governance of Major Public Projects. Lessons 
with a Norwegian Quality Assurance Scheme”, forthcoming in International Journal of 
Architecture, Engineering and Construction   
Samset K., Volden G.H., Welde M. and Bull-Berg H. (2014), Mot sin hensikt. Perverse 
insentiver – om offentlige investeringsprosjekter som ikke forplikter. (Perverse incentives and 
counterproductive investments. Public funding without liabilities for the recipients.) Concept 
report no. 40 
Samset K., Andersen B., Austeng K., (2014), To which extent do projects explore the 
opportunity space? A study of conceptual appraisals and the choice of conceptual solutions. 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, Vol. 7 No. 3,2014 pp. 473-492  
Shenhar A., Dvir D., Levy O., and Maltz A.C., (2001), “Project Success: A Multidimensional 
Strategic Concept”, Long Range Planning, Volume 34, Issue 6, December 2001, Pages 699-
725  
USAID 1980, Design & Evaluation of Aid-assisted Projects, 264p, US AID, Washington, 
1980  
Volden G.H. and Samset K. (2013), Etterevaluering av statlige investeringsprosjekter. 
Konklusjoner, erfaringer og råd basert på pilotevaluering av fire prosjekter (Evaluating 
Public Investment Projects. Lessons and Advice from Pilot Evaluations of Four Projects). 
Concept report no. 30 
Vickerman R. (2008), “Cost-benefit Analysis and the Wider Economic Benefits from Mega-
projects”. Priemus H. Flyvbjerg B. and van Wee B. (eds.) (2008) Decision-Making on Mega-
projects: Cost Benefit Analysis, Planning and Innovation. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. (pp 66-
83). 
Wachs M. (1987), “Forecasts in urban transport planning: Uses, methods, and dilemmas”. 
Climatic Change, 11 (1-2), pp. 61-80. 
Wachs M. (1989), “When planners lie with numbers”. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 55 (4), pp. 476-479. 
Welde M., Eliasson J., Odeck J. and Börjesson M. (2013), Planprosesser, beregningsverktøy 
og bruk av nytte-kostnadsanalyser I vegsektor. En sammenligning av praksis i Norge og 
Sverige (Planning, analytic tools and the use of cost-benefit analysis in the transport sector in 
Norway and Sweden), Concept report no. 33 
Welde M., Samset K., Andersen B. and Austeng K. (2014), Lav prising – store valg. En 
studie av underestimering av kostnader i prosjekters tidligfase. (Low estimates – high stakes. 
A study of underestimation of costs in projects’ earliest phase) Concept report no. 39 
Williams T., (2008), “Decisions Made on Scant Information”, in Williams, Samset and 
Sunnevaag (eds.), Making Essential Choices with Scant Information, Palgrave Macmillan  
Whist E. and Christensen T., (2011), Politisk styring, lokal rasjonalitet og komplekse 
koalisjoner. Tidligfaseprosessen i store offentlige investeringsprosjekter, (Political Control, 
Local Rationality and Complex Coalitions. Focus on the front-end of large public investment 
projects), Concept report no. 26  
32 
 
World Bank (1996), Evaluation results 1994. The International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development: Washington DC  
World Bank (2010), Cost-Benefit Analysis in World Bank Projects, Independent Evaluation 
Group, The World Bank 
 
 
 
